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Abstract 
The term digital money refers to various proposed electronic payment mechanisms designed to 
use by consumers to make retail payments. These mechanisms are based either on smart cards 
or on network money. Smart cards could potentially replace currency as the predominant 
means to pay for retail purchases. Software-based digital money products (network money) 
bring cheap electronic funds transfers to individuals and small firms. This paper examines how 
digital money affects the demand for money and how this process, in turn, affects the demand 
for reserves, monetary control, and the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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Monetary Policy Implications of Digital Money 
 
 
Abstract 
The term digital money refers to various proposed electronic payment mechanisms designed to 
use by consumers to make retail payments. These mechanisms are based either on smart cards 
or on network money. Smart cards could potentially replace currency as the predominant 
means to pay for retail purchases. Software-based digital money products (network money) 
bring cheap electronic funds transfers to individuals and small firms. This paper examines how 
digital money affects the demand for money and how this process, in turn, affects the demand 
for reserves, monetary control, and the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
Introduction 
The potential of digital money to replace currency in the payment for retail goods and its 
ability to flow freely across international borders has alarmed central bankers, the media, and 
scholars. There are rumors that central banks will lose control over the monetary aggregates, 
and, even worse, that digital money will alter foreign exchange rates, disturb money supplies, 
and encourage an overall financial crisis (Tanaka 1996). Opinions on this issue could not be 
more diverse. Ely (1996), for example, suggests that, fundamentally, digital money is no 
different from all other forms of money that exist today; consequently, the monetary policy 
implications of digital money are nil.  
The proposed electronic payment mechanisms are based either on the smart card or on 
network money. The smart card, also known as the electronic purse, is a plastic card that has 
embedded a microprocessor, which can be loaded with a monetary value. With each purchase 
the card’s value is reduced. The smart card is reloadable, can be used for multiple purposes, 
and needs no online authorization for value transfer. The first two characteristics distinguish 
the smart card from the single-purpose, prepaid card widely used in Europe. The third 
characteristic distinguishes it from the debit card.1 Network money refers to software that 
allows the transfer of value on computer networks, particularly on the Internet. 
Like a travelers check, a digital money balance is a floating claim on a private bank or 
other financial institution that is not linked to any particular account (White 1996). A digital 
                                                 
1 Note that unlike all other existing electronic payment instruments (e.g. debit cards and credit cards) digital 
money is a medium of exchange, i.e., it is a truly (private) money. A debit card is not a medium of exchange. It is 
an electronic payment instrument that initiates a transfer of value between two transaction accounts. Literature on 
digital money has created many other expressions such as e-money, electronic money, network money, digital 
currency, electronic currency, digital cash, electronic cash, e-cash, etc. We prefer the term digital money to 
distinguish it from other electronic payment instruments such as debit and credit cards. For an extended definition 
and characterization of digital money see BIS (1996a, 1996b), Stuber (1996), or CBO (1996). 
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money balance on a smart card or computer hard drive is a form of credit because the balance 
is the liability of its issuer. An institution’s incentive to issue digital money is the interest-free 
or low interest debt financing that the outstanding digital money balance provides. 
Widespread use of digital money could affect central banks in such areas as monetary 
policy, banking supervision, supervision of the payment system, and the stability of the 
financial system. The main concern of central bankers today is security.2 A security breach -- 
counterfeiting -- of a digital money product widely used could severely disturb the financial 
system. 
For banking supervisors, the main issues are whether institutions, other than banks, 
should be allowed to issue digital money,3 and whether traditional regulations, such as reserve 
requirements and capital regulations, should be extended to issuers of digital money products. 
In addition, there is concern that digital money could facilitate money laundering, fraud, and 
tax evasion. Widespread use of digital money could facilitate illegal activities because, in 
contrast to debit card and credit card transactions, some forms of digital money allow users to 
remain anonymous.  
This paper examines how a widespread use of digital money would affect monetary 
policy. In section 1 we analyze how digital money affects the use of various payment 
instruments. Particularly, we study its effect on the demand for central bank currency and 
transaction deposits. We find that smart cards, designed as a substitute for central bank 
currency, could eventually replace the entire stock of central bank currency and, to a lesser 
extent, reduce the demand for transaction deposits.  
Currency, as the predominant liability of central banks, plays an important role in the 
implementation of monetary policy. Section 2 discusses the implications of an extensive 
substitution of central bank currency for monetary control, particularly, the ability of central 
banks to control the market for bank reserves. Replacement of central bank currency and lower 
demand for transaction deposits would also affect monetary aggregates and the functioning of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. These effects are studied in Section 3. 
                                                 
2 In November 1995, central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries commissioned studies on the 
security of digital money products. They published their results in BIS (1996a). 
3 The European Union, for example, plans to limit the issuance of multipurpose smart cards to registered banks 
only. See EMI (1994).  
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1 The Demand for Money 
 
The section examines digital money’s potential to replace central bank currency and other 
media of exchange. We begin with a description of the characteristics of digital money 
products. We then present a model that studies how a representative agent would choose 
among various payment instruments. The section ends with a complementary model that 
investigates the strategic interaction between firms and households that determines whether a 
new medium of exchange can be successfully introduced. 
 
Characteristics of digital money products  
Digital money products based on smart cards are designed to facilitate small-value payments in 
face-to-face retail transactions. The average transaction is expected to be less than $20, a sum 
for which use of credit and debit cards is inconvenient and too costly (CBO 1996). It is, 
therefore, expected that digital money products based on smart cards will reduce use of central 
bank notes and coins and, to a much lesser extent, use of debit and credit cards for face-to-face 
payments. Software-based digital money products are more likely to reduce use of checks, 
debit cards, and credit cards for non-face-to-face payments, i.e., for online payments. 
In development are many different types of digital money products with varying 
characteristics. However, in principal at least, digital money can be designed to share all 
characteristics of central bank currency, and it could, therefore, be a very close substitute for 
bank notes and coins. The main differences are that digital money is not legal tender, which 
would reduce its acceptance initially, and that, unlike currency and all other media of exchange 
today, digital money does not require the physical presence of payer and payee for payment 
finality because digital money balances can be transferred across telecommunication networks 
in real time. Table 1 lists the main characteristics of currency, digital money, checks, and debit 
cards. 
Replacement of currency could benefit issuers, consumers, and merchants. Issuers would 
benefit from the interest-free debt financing provided by digital money balances.4 Consumers 
would benefit from the convenience. For merchants, accepting digital money would reduce 
costs if bits and bytes replaced physical coins and notes. The estimated annual costs of 
handling central bank currency by U.S. retailers and banks are $60 billion, which includes 
costs of processing and accounting of money, storage, transport, and security (Hayes et al. 
1996).5 Hayes et al. (1996) also suggests that the cost of an electronic payment ranges between 
                                                 
4 Today, almost all proposed digital money schemes are developed by private institutions. The issuer, however, 
could also be a central bank. 
5 Beside cost savings, Hayes et al. (1996) suggest additional advantages of using digital money including an 
expected reduction in some forms of fraud, greater safety and security, and a potential for value-added services. 
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one-third and one-half of a paper check or paper giro payment. An indication of the low cost 
per transaction are the several money schemes under development that will allow (online) 
payment of transaction for as little as one cent (micropayments). 
 
While digital money products based on smart cards would mainly reduce the demand for 
currency, software-based digital money products could also affect the demand for transaction 
deposits due to reduced transaction cost and learning spillovers. Software-based digital money 
products could facilitate and reduce the cost of transferring value among different types of 
accounts, banks, and countries. White (1996) has pointed out the implications of reducing the 
cost of wiring money across borders:  
What strikes me as the most exciting potential development to come from the new payment 
technologies is that, as they lower the cost of wiring money from $20 to 2 cents or less per 
transaction, they give ordinary small savers affordable access to offshore banking. With direct 
deposit of paychecks, and with analog currency available at ATMs whenever we want it, many of 
us no longer need to visit our bank in person. Why not keep your account with a reputable bank 
(perhaps a branch of a major Swiss bank) in the Bahamas or Cayman Islands?  
 
The second reason -- learning spillovers -- refers to the notion that using software-based 
digital money products will improve the skills and knowledge of their users regarding the use 
of personal finance software and telecommunication technologies to optimize their finance. 
Personal finance software products keep track of account information and monetary 
transactions and help in creating budgets, managing investments, and filling out tax forms. 
They also provide access to electronic banking and electronic bill payment services.  
                                                                                                                                                          
See also the CBO (1996) study for the various incentives for issuers, consumers, and merchants to use digital 
money. 
Table 1: Characteristics of currency, digital money*, checks, and debit cards 
Characteristics Digital money Currency Check Debit card 
Legal tender No Yes No No 
Acceptability ? Widespread Restricted Restricted 
Marginal cost per 
transaction 
Low Medium High Medium 
Payment finality face-
to-face transaction 
Yes Yes No No 
Payment finality non-
face-to-face 
transaction 
Yes No No No 
User-anonymity Yes Yes No No 
* Many digital money schemes are being developed. Here, we consider a form of digital money that 
is as similar as possible to currency. E-cash, for example, the digital money scheme developed by 
Digicash, satisfies all the above characteristics. 
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With these software products, small businesses and households will be able to optimize 
their money holdings more frequently and to automate basic tasks. One day, for example, 
software agents could automatically invest short-term excess liquidity overnight for ordinary 
households.6 It is difficult to predict the quantitative effects of these developments on the 
demand for transaction deposits. However, lower transaction costs and more frequent 
adjustments of money holdings suggests a lower demand for demand deposits. 
 
Competition among several media of exchange 
The preceding analysis considered the characteristics of digital money products to obtain a first 
impression of their potential to substitute for more traditional media of exchange. Next, we 
study the demand for various media in a Baumol-Tobin type model of optimal money 
holdings. Baumol-Tobin type models are based on an inventory theoretic approach to explain 
the transaction demand for money.7 The following discussion is based on a model by 
Santomero-Seater (1996). 
Santomero-Seater study the behavior of a representative agent who can choose to pay for 
purchases among different generally accepted payment instruments. Attention is focused on 
how the characteristics of these monies affect the representative agent’s choice of transaction 
vehicle, transaction frequency, and average balance in various media. We present a simplified 
version of their model, focusing on the demand for digital money. 
 Santomero-Seater’s model is based on the standard Baumol-Tobin assumptions except 
that they allow consumers to hold inventories of commodities and they consider the use of 
several, generally accepted media simultaneously. The representative agent receives his 
income Y at the beginning of a period of fixed length. During this period, he spends the entire 
income by buying and consuming G different commodities g, g = 1, …, G. 
There are L media of exchange, Mi, i = 1, …, L. The agent can use any or all of these 
media to buy each type of good; however, a separate shopping trip is required for each. During 
the period, he makes Zgi shopping trips to buy commodity g with money Mi. Each shopping trip 
is associated with shopping cost bgi. The household spends only a fraction of his income during 
one shopping trip. Unspent income is hold in a single savings asset, S, and in money balances. 
The savings asset earns the rate of return rs, and the various kinds of money earn rMi. The 
return on the savings assets is larger than the return on any of the monetary assets.  
There are Ti conversion trips to obtain money Mi and each conversion costs ai. 
Conversion and shopping trips, which occur between conversion trips, are evenly spaced 
throughout the period. The household seeks to maximize the profit from managing its assets 
                                                 
6 Software agents are intelligent programs that can simplify the processing, monitoring, and control of digital 
transactions by automating many activities. 
7 Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). 
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over a given time period. Because all conversion and shopping trips are evenly spaced and 
consumption proceeds at a constant rate, the profit function of the representative agent can be 
written in terms of average values of the respective assets. 
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The household chooses the optimal values for Ti , Zgi, and Xgi. Xgi is the amount of commodity 
g that is bought during a shopping trip with money Mi.  
Our main interest is to study the demand for digital money. If 
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According to ( 2 ), the demand for digital money depends on the cost of transferring 
digital money on a smart card or a computer hard drive, aEM, the cost per shopping trip bgEM, 
total digital money spending, A, and the interest differential between the savings asset and 
electronic money balances, 
EMMs
rr  .  
Note, to evaluate the dependence of the demand for digital money on these parameters 
one cannot simply take derivatives and evaluate them. To see this, consider a marginal increase 
of transaction cost, aEM. This could have two opposing effects. For a given volume of 
purchases with digital money, A, the representative agent would hold larger digital money 
balances. The increase, however, could trigger a reduction in the use of digital money by 
reducing the number of commodities bought with digital money.  
The cost of using digital money to buy commodity g, i.e., the cost per shopping trip bgEM, 
consists mainly of potential fees per purchase charged by the shop owner or issuer of the smart 
card.8 It is likely that the use of digital money will be free for consumers because competition 
between digital money issuers and the competition between digital money and costless paper 
money will prevent issuers to raise fees on digital money transactions. If the cost per shopping 
trip is zero, i.e., bgEM = 0, the equation for the demand for digital money, MEM, is reduced to the 
standard Baumol-Tobin square-root formula:   
                                                 
8 It also includes the expected cost of lose and theft, and the expected cost of a card becoming unreadable. 
Expected costs of lose and theft are similar to paper currency. The risk of loosing money due to a technical failure 
is apparently larger with smart cards. 
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Equation ( 3 ) suggests that demand for digital money will likely be small due to the 
magnitude of the transaction cost, aEM , and due to the total amount of digital money spent, A.  
The cost of conversion, aEM, is likely to be small and will decrease further as technology 
improves and smart card readers are more widely distributed. The cost of conversion includes 
opportunity cost of time spent for this activity (for example, walking to a smart card reader) 
and per transaction fees charged by the issuer of digital money and/or by the provider of the 
telecommunication service. With the proliferation of telephones, personal computers, ATMs, 
and point-of-sale equipment to read smart cards, consumers will be able to load their smart 
cards almost everywhere, reducing the opportunity cost to minimal amounts. Competition 
among issuers of digital money makes it likely that consumers will pay no per transaction fees 
and negligible telecommunication cost. 
Low cost of conversion suggests a low demand for digital money, i.e., a low balance of 
digital money on smart cards and computer hard drives. As pointed out by Grigg (1996), the 
demand for digital money designed specifically for value transfer on the Internet (Internet 
money) could approach zero for the same reason. A consumer who wants to make an on-line 
payment could with the same push of the button download the desired amount from his 
interest-bearing account and then transfer the amount to the payee instead of storing digital 
money on his hard drive and making payments out of it. 
Demand for digital money also depends on the total amount of digital money, A, spent in 
each period. A is likely to remain small for a long time, but it could eventually grow as digital 
money substantially replaces currency. What remains to be considered is the effect on the 
interest differential 
EMMs
rr  . Competitive pressure could force the digital money issuer to pay 
interest on digital money balances. The smaller this differential, the larger the demand for 
digital money. 
What remains to discuss is the model’s prediction of digital money’s potential to replace 
existing payment instruments, particularly, central bank currency. Santomero-Seater (1996, 
p. 959) suggest that smart cards represent a credible threat for central bank currency:  
The stored value card represents a credible threat for cash transactions. Rates of return are both 
zero, […]. Given their new ease of use, smart cards could also be competitive from a transfer fee 
perspective. In fact, given the lower cost of transferring value into the card, it may dominate cash in 
the near future. 
In summary, the comparison of the characteristics of digital money and paper currency in 
Table 1 and Santomero-Seater’s model suggest that digital money has the potential to replace 
central bank currency. Moreover, the Santomero-Seater’s Baumol-Tobin approach to derive 
the transaction demand for digital money suggest that demand for digital money will be low 
due to small conversion cost. In particular, the demand for network money will be negligible. 
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Strategic interaction between firms and households 
The Santomero-Seater model is an important step in studying multiple payment instruments 
and the pattern of their use. The model suggests that in equilibrium different media of 
exchange are in circulation and that agents with different income or consumption pattern might 
buy the same commodity with different media.9 Thus, it neatly captures the variety of payment 
instruments we observe in reality. 
The main shortcoming of the model, however, is that while consumers can optimize 
among different types of monies, shop owners don’t have a choice. They must passively accept 
whatever payment instrument agents want to use. That is, in their model all media of exchange 
are generally accepted. This is in contrast to what we observe in reality where shop owners are 
rather choosy when it comes to accepting a payment instrument. The model does not take into 
account the strategic interaction between firms and consumers that determine whether a 
medium of exchange can be successfully introduced. 
We end this section with a simple model that captures this strategic interaction. The 
starting point, i.e., the status quo, is the existence of a generally accepted medium of exchange 
used to pay for all purchases in the economy. At some point, a private entity launches a new 
type of money with favorable properties for shop owners and consumers. The use of the new 
money requires an initial investment for both firms and consumers. Each agent has to decide 
whether he wants to invest to use the new money in the future. The rate of return of the 
investment depends on the investment decisions of all other agents. Thus, comparable to a 
telephone network, the incentive to participate depends on the number of users. If only a few 
merchants accept digital money, why would a consumer acquire a smart card or network 
money? At the same time, if only a few consumers are using smart cards, why would a 
merchant invest in equipment to process digital money? 
To keep the model simple, there is one representative agent and one representative shop 
and there is only one transaction between the two. Both parties have to decide whether they 
want to use the old or the new money to pay for the transaction. The status quo type of money 
is denoted by M1 and is called cash. The use of cash costs a1 for the consumer and also for the 
shop owner. The new medium of exchange, named digital cash, is denoted by M2. The use of 
                                                 
9 The following additional results emerge from the model. An agent uses always the same medium of exchange to 
buy a given commodity. The larger the share of total expenditure of a particular commodity, the more likely the 
medium of exchange used by the household will offer the highest rate of return. An increase in the rate of return 
of the savings asset tends to reduce the number of monies used. A change in the rate of return of a medium of 
exchange has ambiguous effects. It can increase or decrease its use. An increase of the conversion cost of one 
medium of exchange reduces its use. The number of money used increases when income increases. 
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digital cash requires from both parties an initial investment expenditure f.10 The use of digital 
cash costs a2 for the consumer and also for the shop owner. Digital cash has superior 
characteristics for both merchants and consumers. In particular, for both parties the total cost 
are smaller when they use digital cash, i.e., a1 > f + a2.  
Of course, the profitability of the investment depends on whether the other party uses the 
new medium of exchange. Denote the probability that the shop owner invests in the new 
medium of exchange by 1  and the probability that the consumer invests by 2 . Then when P 
denotes the revenue of the transaction, the profit function for the shop owner is: 
( 4 )             faPaPaP  1222111 11  . 
 
The shop owner chooses 1  to maximize ( 4 ). The best response correspondence is 
given by the following rule: 
If   212 aaf  , the shop owner does not invest; 
If   212 aaf  , the shop owner invests in the new media; and  
If   212 aaf  , the shop owner is indifferent.  
 
Note that the larger the investment expenditure, f, and the larger the transaction cost of 
digital cash, a2, the less likely the shop owner will invest in digital cash. Also, the larger the 
transaction cost of cash, a1, and the larger the probability that the consumer will use the new 
medium, 2 , the more likely the shop owner will invest in the new medium of exchange. 
Next, consider the representative consumer who has to decide whether to make the 
investment. The expenditure function of the consumer is 
( 5 )             faPaPaPe  1121212 11   
 
The consumer chooses 2  to minimize expenditure e. The best response correspondence 
is given by the following rule: 
If   211 aaf  , the consumer does not invest; 
If   211 aaf  , the consumer invests in the new media; and  
If   211 aaf  , the consumer is indifferent.  
                                                 
10  Here, f is total fixed cost. In a more dynamic setup, the representative consumer would repeatedly buy at the 
shop and f would represent the appropriate share of the fixed cost per transaction. However, with this assumption 
f would be a non-decreasing, non-linear function of 1  and 2  (defined below) complicating the analysis without 
adding much insight. 
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Figure 1: Best response correspondence of shop owner (dashed curve) and consumer (solid curve) 
who have to decide whether to use the new media of exchange. The best response of either party 
depends on the action of the other party. 
The best response correspondences of the representative agent and the representative 
shop owner are shown in Figure 1. There are three (Nash) equilibria in this game. In the first 
equilibrium, A, the new medium of exchange is not used even though it would be less costly 
for both parties. In the second equilibrium, B, cash and digital cash are used simultaneously 
and in the last equilibrium, C, only digital cash is used. In the Santomero-Seater approach 
digital cash would substitute for cash unambiguously. The equilibrium would be C because the 
shop owner would invest and accept digital cash per assumption and the best response of the 
household would be to invest. 
Note further that even with zero investment cost equilibria A prevails. If consumers do 
not use digital cash, a best response for shops is not to accept digital cash either. And, given 
that shops do not accept cash, a consumer’s best response is not to use cash, too. We have kept 
the model as simple as possible. However, even in a more realistic setup the basic problem of 
strategic interaction remains, i.e., the optimal behavior of one party depends on the expected 
action taken by the other party.  
The model suggests that even when replacement of central bank currency would benefit 
firms and households, cash wouldn’t be replaced as easily. Issuers of digital money products 
would have to convince consumers and shop owners that their investment would have a 
positive rate of return; this basically means that their particular technology would succeed in 
the market against other digital money schemes and other traditional media. Convincing agents 
to use digital money products and providing a secure product will make the implementation of 
a digital money scheme costly. The presence of network externalities suggest that only a few 
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multipurpose digital money schemes will be successfully implemented, most likely by a 
number of cooperating banks in association with a major credit card company. 
 
 
 
12 
2 Monetary Policy Implementation 
 
Monetary control is based on the ability of central banks to determine the conditions that 
equilibrate demand and supply in the market for bank reserves. In this market central banks are 
monopolistic suppliers of reserve assets and they can also directly affect demand, for instance, 
by setting reserve requirements and by shaping and operating key interbank settlement systems 
(Borio 1997). Central banks can either decide to control the total quantity of reserves or the 
price at which they are traded among banks. In most countries central banks aim at stabilizing 
the short-term interest rate at which banks trade these reserves. In the following we study the 
impact of digital money on the demand for bank reserves (deposits at the central bank) and 
discuss the implications for monetary control. 
 
Effects on the demand for reserves 
Banks hold reserves for two reasons. ( 1 ) In many countries they are required to hold a 
percentage of certain types of deposits as reserves. The percentage and the types of deposits 
that require the holding of reserves differ from country to country. ( 2 ) Banks hold reserves for 
settlement purposes to cushion costly daylight and overnight overdrafts. Reserves are held as 
book entries at the central bank and as vault cash, i.e., central bank currency holdings of 
banks.11 
On the market for reserves, banks trade reserves to meet reserve requirements and to 
adjust their settlement balances. The price for these reserves (in the U.S. the Federal Funds 
rate) is the primary interest rate that central banks influence through their monetary 
instruments. A permanent change in the price for reserves influences other money and credit 
rates and, eventually, the real sector of the economy and the price level.  
Demand for reserves depends crucially on the institutional arrangements prevailing in a 
country. Among these arrangements the existence of (binding) reserve requirements, the nature 
of payment and settlement procedures, the types of eligible reserve assets, and the conditions 
of central bank assistance (standing facilities) influence the demand for reserves. The 
characteristics of these institutional arrangements differ from country to country. For an 
excellent and detailed description of institutional arrangements in several industrial countries 
consider Borio (1997).  
The banking systems’ demand for reserves to meet reserve requirements depends on the 
public’s demand for reservable deposits and reserve ratios. The demand for reserves would be 
reduced if digital money were to substitute for reservable deposits. Section 1 suggests that 
software-based digital money products could reduce the demand for transaction deposits. The 
                                                 
11 The types of liquid assets that are counted as reserves differ from country to country.  
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BIS (1996b) report, however, suggests that substitution of reservable deposits would be small: 
“It is conceivable that a very extensive substitution [of reservable deposits] could complicate 
the operating procedures used by central banks to set money market interest rates. However, 
since e-money is expected to substitute mostly for cash rather than deposits, it is highly 
unlikely that operating techniques will need to be adjusted significantly.”  
During the 1990s, many industrial countries have radically reduced their reserve 
requirements. For, example, since 1990 reserve requirements have been reduced in all of the 
major (G7) industrial countries (Bisignano 1996). Today, in Belgium and Sweden no reserve 
requirements are in place. Digital money products, particularly, software-based digital money 
products that facilitate and reduce the cost of transferring value between different types of 
accounts, banks (and nonbanks), and countries, could reduce the demand for reserves 
indirectly by adding to this trend.  
If bank customers were to use these new payment instruments extensively, the pressure 
on central banks to reduce reserve ratios and the number of types of reservable liabilities 
would increase. Particularly, if foreign intermediaries were to increasingly attract (transaction) 
deposits of domestic residents across public computer networks, central banks would be 
pressed to lower reserve ratios to help domestic banks to compete for domestic (and foreign) 
deposits (Berentsen 1997b). Reserve requirements are basically a tax on financial 
intermediation and banks that are subject to reserve requirements have a competitive 
disadvantage compared with nonbank financial intermediaries offering close financial 
substitutes. A study by the Bank of Japan (1995) on the recent reform of reserve requirements 
in major industrial countries suggests that the main reason for reducing reserve requirements 
has been to lower the “burden” (“distortion”, “inequality”) on depository institutions 
(Bisignano, 1996).  
In countries where vault cash is counted as reserves, substitution of central bank 
currency would reduce the holdings of vault cash thereby increasing the demand for bank 
reserves (deposits at the central bank) to meet reserve requirements. For example, in France 
total reserve requirements are FF 20 billion of which FF 13 billion are held in the form of vault 
cash (Borio 1997). If demand for the French franc were to vanish, French banks would want to 
convert the FF 13 billion of cash balances into FF 13 billion in reserve holdings at the Banque 
de France. 
Without reserve requirements or when reserve requirements are non binding, the demand 
for bank reserves is essentially a demand for settlement balances. The demand for reserves 
would be affected if digital money were to change the need for settlement balances. In the 
absence of reserve requirements, a bank would still want to hold reserves to meet unforeseen 
liquidity withdrawals by its customers. However, the holding of reserves is costly and banks 
have to choose the optimal amount of reserves. This basic liquidity management problem is 
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presented in Baltensperger (1980).12 During a given period, a representative bank faces a 
stochastic outflow of deposits, X, with density function f(X). At the beginning of the period the 
bank has reserves R. If at the end of the period 0 RX , the bank has a reserve deficiency 
and has to bear the cost  RXp  . p measures the cost per unit reserve deficiency. The holding 
of reserves is costly, too, because reserves could alternatively be invested and earn a rate of 
return of r.  
In the absence of reserve requirements the bank chooses its reserve level such that 
marginal cost of reserve holdings, r, equal marginal return of holding additional reserves, i.e., 
 ( 6 )      
R
dXXfpr   
 
Digital money would affect the demand for reserves if it were to change the cost of 
reserves, r, the unit cost of reserve deficiency, p, or the probability that a reserve deficiency 
occurs  
R
dXXf . There is no reason to believe that digital money per se would affect either 
of these parameters. The rate of return on loans, r, is determined by demand and supply in the 
market for loans and should be not affected by the emergence of digital money products. 
Equally, the unit cost of reserve deficiency, p, is determined by the conditions of central bank 
assistance and the cost of selling illiquid assets at short notice, and should as well not be 
affected by digital money products. And finally, digital money products per se should not 
affect the probability that a reserve deficiency occurs.13  
Thus, the liquidity management approach suggests that digital money would not reduce 
the demand for settlement balances importantly. This implies that even with zero reserve 
requirements or even when digital money products extensively substitute for reservable 
deposits, the settlement function of central banks would continue to guarantee an ongoing 
demand for reserves. Reserves may not be used as a medium in which to store value overnight 
and longer, but it still will be required as a vehicle for transferring value during a day (Jordan-
Stevens, 1996). Havrilesky (1987) suggests that this demand would be sufficient for the 
monetary base to remain a viable policy instrument and that open-market operations would 
work as they do today. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Many authors have modeled in different variations the liquidity management problem of banks (see 
Baltensperger 1980). The discussion that follows is based on his exposition. 
13 Note, however, that Berentsen (1997b) suggest that network money could increase the variability of bank 
deposits, which could increase the demand for reserves. 
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In summary, a widespread use of digital money could affect demand for reserves as 
follows: 
 It would reduce demand if digital money were to substitute for reservable deposits. 
However, the reduction should be moderate because digital money is expected to 
substitute mainly for central bank currency. 
 It could reduce demand by forcing central banks to reduce the number of reservable 
liabilities and to lower reserve ratios. 
 It would increase demand if banks were to substitute vault cash for reserves held at 
the central bank to meet reserve requirements.  
 The demand for settlement balances is likely to be unaffected by digital money 
because digital money does neither affect the need for settlement balances not the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves. 
 
Supply of reserves (monetary control) 
Initially, substitution of central bank currency would increase cash holdings of banks since 
customers would return excess cash. Banks would observe that their cash holdings exceed the 
optimal amount and they would return cash to the central bank, thereby increasing their 
reserves at the books of the central bank. Consequently, substitution of central bank currency 
would increase total supply of reserves. Therefore, substitution of central bank currency is 
equivalent to an expansionary open market operation that provides additional reserves to the 
banking system (Berentsen 1997a). 
Central banks could be forced to step in and absorb these reserves by selling central bank 
assets. Because central bank currency is by far the largest liability of central banks, an 
extensive substitution could reduce the monetary base to the extent that it would adversely 
affect monetary policy implementation. This concern has been raised by BIS (1996b):  
Since cash is a large or the largest component of central bank liabilities in many countries, a very 
extensive spread of e-money could shrink central bank balance sheets significantly. The issue is at 
what point this shrinkage might begin to adversely affect monetary policy implementation. The 
relatively modest size of open market operations on normal days suggests that a relatively small 
balance sheet might be sufficient. However, special circumstances could arise in which the central 
bank might not be able to implement reserve-absorbing operations on a large enough scale (for 
example, to sterilize the effects of large purchases in the foreign exchange markets) because it 
lacked sufficient assets on its balance sheet. 
The special circumstances mentioned in the BIS report refer mainly to times when 
exchange rate commitments of central banks are challenged by market forces. To keep 
exchange rates in line, central banks intervene in the foreign exchange markets by either 
buying or selling foreign currency for domestic. These exchange rate operations affect the 
liquidity in the system. In fact, the net creation of liquidity through foreign channels can be 
16 
huge, amounting in some cases to large fractions of the outstanding stock of policy instruments 
(Borio 1997).  
When exchange rates come under upward pressure, the main problem is to absorb excess 
liquidity created by the selling domestic currency for foreign. The main risk is that the central 
bank may not have enough assets to sell to withdraw the liquidity. When exchange rates come 
under downward pressure, central bank purchases of domestic currency for foreign absorbs 
liquidity. In this case, the risk is that central banks may not succeed in injecting sufficient 
funds to meet the minimum settlement balance needs of banks, effectively losing control over 
short-term rates and disturbing the settlement process (Borio 1997).  
The potential contraction of balance sheets is non-trivial. For example, in 1994, total 
liabilities of the Federal Reserve amounted to 412,606 millions of dollars of which 359,698 
millions were Federal Reserve notes. Thus, a complete substitution of central bank notes 
would have reduced total liabilities and assets by 87 percent. Table 2 lists total liabilities and 
central bank currency in circulation for a number of industrial countries. 
Table 2: Total liabilities (or assets) and currency in circulation* 
Countries Total assets and liabilities in 
local currency( in thousands) 
Currency in circulation (in 
thousands) 
Currency-to-total 
assets ratio 
Belgium 945,716,598 412,189,699 0.44 
Canada** 30,200,600  28,777,700  0.95 
France 668,846,000 266,659,000 0.40 
Germany** 354,447,470 248,363,466 0.70 
Italy 356,359,672,000 100,024,826,000 0.28 
United States 412,606,000 359,698,000 0.87 
*Source of data in the first and second columns: Moody’s International Manual (1996); for the 
United States BoG (1994). Data are from 1994. **Data from 1995. 
 
A final note is required, here. There is some concern that digital money could also affect 
monetary control by reducing the independence of central banks. Today, central bank 
independence is based on their ability to generate (more than) sufficient seigniorage income to 
pay for their operations. Widespread substitution of central bank currency could reduce 
seigniorage revenue to the extent that central banks would have to turn to other income sources 
such as government subsidies. However, the share of seigniorage income that is used by 
central banks to pay for their expenses is small, which suggests that even an extensive 
substitution would not force central banks to rely on other income sources. See Boeschoten-
Heblink (1996) who studies the potential seigniorage loss of central banks in the G-10 
countries. 
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3 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
This section considers the potential effects of digital money on the monetary 
transmission mechanism. It examines how digital money affects the income velocity of base 
money and the narrowly defined stock of money. 
 
Velocity of money 
The income velocity of money is of interest to central bankers who rely on monetary 
aggregates either as indicators or as ultimate targets. Stable velocity of money is crucial to 
them. The theoretical background underlying the use of these aggregates is provided by the 
quantity theory, which focuses on the following equation: 
( 7 )   M V P Y    
 
According to ( 7 ), the stock of money, M, times its velocity, V, equals nominal GNP, 
P Y . If V and Y are known in advance, the central banks can control the price level, P, by 
choosing the appropriate level for the money stock, M. To do so, however, two requisites must 
be satisfied. ( 1 ) The velocity of money must be predictable and stable. ( 2 ) The central bank 
must be able to determine the money stock. The next subsection discusses problems in 
controlling the stock of narrowly defined money. Here we study the implications of digital 
money for the level and the stability of the income velocity of money of the monetary base.14 
Level effects. The preceding sections suggest that digital money could substantially 
replace central bank currency. This would, assuming central bank reserve-absorbing 
operations, reduce the monetary base. Consequently, the income velocity of base money will 
increase. Jordan-Stevens (1996) suggest that the income velocity of base money could 
approach infinity: 
The kernel of the money question beginning to emerge to on the 21st century horizon is not just 
about the predictability of changes in velocity, or even the instability induced by ever-higher 
velocity. Rather, what may be new and different about the 21st century is the possibility that the 
velocity of central bank money might approach infinity – that is, that there will be no appreciable 
domestic demand at all for central bank money – whether currency or banks’ deposit balances at 
reserve banks. 
A large increase in velocity is troublesome, even if measured correctly. Failures in 
achieving monetary targets have larger unwanted effects on nominal income, as suggested by 
the quantity equation. That is, higher velocity of money makes it more difficult to maintain 
                                                 
14 Digital money could also affect the income velocity of the narrowly defined stock of money, M1. However, the 
effect depends on the actions taken by central banks. In principal, they have the means to offset any change in 
M1. See the following subsection.  
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financial stability, unless there are comparable increases in the precision with which the central 
bank can control the supply of its monetary liabilities (Jordan-Stevens 1996). 
Variability. During the transition to a cashless society, the various velocity measures 
could be less stable. This could complicate monetary policy decision making for countries that 
rely on monetary aggregates as targets or indicators because they would be more difficult to 
define and achieve (Jordan-Stevens 1996). However, the transition from cash to digital money 
could take a long time, and there is a priori no reason why this transition should be 
accompanied by large unexpected short-term variations in the income velocity of money. 
Moreover, during the initial stage, the substitution is expected to be rather moderate, which 
would allow central banks enough time to observe developments and take necessary steps. 
 
Monetary aggregates 
Substitution of central bank currency would affect all monetary aggregates. The largest impact, 
however, would be on the narrowly defined stock of money, M1. We will, therefore, confine 
our attention to changes in M1. To simplify the analysis, M1 consists only of central bank 
currency, C, and transaction deposits, D. For some purposes we also include digital money 
balances, EM, in the definition of M1. 
Conversion of central bank currency into digital money balances would affect M1 
through two channels. Obviously, a substitution of central bank currency would affect M1 
most directly through a reduction in the stock of central bank currency. Conversion, however, 
would also change the reserve position of banks and, eventually, the size of deposits, D. This 
second channel could be of more importance because it potentially has a larger impact on M1. 
The liquidity effect of a conversion of central bank currency into digital money balances 
depends on whether binding reserve requirements are in place. Banks expand their deposits by 
making loans. When a bank makes a loan, this is automatically matched by an equal increase 
in deposits. Banks are willing to make loans if the marginal return on loans is larger than the 
marginal costs of deposits. With binding reserve requirements, this condition is met but their 
reserve position prevents the provision of further loans and, correspondingly, a further 
expansion of deposits. Thus, with binding reserve requirements, the marginal rate of return on 
loans is larger that the marginal costs of deposits and banks would be willing to expand their 
deposits at the prevailing rate of return and costs, respectively. 
The following analysis, therefore, distinguishes two scenarios. ( 1 ) A setup with zero or 
non-binding reserve requirements and ( 2 ) a setup with binding reserve requirements. 
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Zero or non-binding reserve requirements 
Let us first consider the liquidity effect of a conversion of one unit of central bank currency 
into one unit of digital money balances when zero or non-binding reserve requirements are in 
place. With zero or non-binding reserve requirements, the market for deposits and loans is in 
equilibrium and the marginal return on loans equals marginal costs of deposits. Banks have 
some market power, i.e., a bank increasing its supply of loans will marginally reduce the rate 
of return on loans resulting in a loss.15 Thus, at the prevailing rate of return on loans and the 
prevailing costs of deposits banks are not willing to increase deposits by providing additional 
loans.  
The conversion implies that the total amount of currency in circulation, C, decreases by 
one unit and, at the same time, that the banking system’s stock of central bank currency (vault 
cash) increases by one unit. The bank receiving the currency unit can either hold it as vault 
cash or return it to the central bank, thereby increasing its reserves at the central bank by one 
unit.  
It is likely that the bank is not willing to hold the unit as vault cash because the rate of 
return on vault cash is zero while the rate of return on reserves at the central bank is positive 
because it reduces marginally the probability that the bank has to borrow funds for settlement 
purposes. Although, banks holding returned currency as vault cash is a rather simplistic story, 
this assumption, nevertheless, is often used to evaluate the effect of digital money on the 
money supply. For example, the CBO (1996, p. 42) study on digital money suggests that “if 
the issuers hold 100 percent cash reserves for balances on stored-value cards […] the money 
supply will not change.” 
Since banks are not willing to expand their deposits and the prevailing rate of return on 
loans and costs of deposits, to affect D substitution of central bank currency must either change 
the rate of return on loans or the costs of deposits. Because the conversion of currency into 
digital money balances does not affect the banking system’s demand for settlement balances 
(reserves), the increase in the supply of reserves would marginally decrease the interest rate for 
settlement balances. That is, banks are only willing to hold the additional unit of reserves when 
the price for settlement balances decreases marginally.16  
The lower costs of settlement balances decrease the costs of making deposits. 
Consequently, banks would marginally increase lending and deposit taking. Thus, D would 
increase unambiguously. The overall effect on M1, however, is not determined because central 
                                                 
15 In many models of the banking firm deposit rates are a function of the deposit level. That is, it is assumed that 
banks have some market power and their actions affect the price in the deposit market. For a discussion of this 
assumption and a survey of banking firm models, consider Baltensperger (1980). 
16 On the market for reserves, banks trade reserves to meet reserve requirements and to adjust their settlement 
balances. The price for these reserves, in the U.S. the Federal Funds rate, is the primary interest rate that central 
banks influence through their monetary instruments. The substitution of central bank currency increases the total 
supply of reserves in the economy. Because the demand for these reserves hasn’t changed, the price for these 
reserves must fall.  
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bank currency, C, would be reduced by one unit. However, because the effect of a conversion 
on deposits is equivalent to the effect of an expansionary open market operation, it is more 
likely that the increase in D would offset the decrease in C; consequently, M1 would 
increase.17 
The picture changes slightly if digital money balances are included in the definition of 
M1. In this case, M1 would increase unambiguously because the reduction in C would be 
matched by an offsetting increase in EM and D would increase unambiguously. Thus, if 
electronic money balances are not included in the definition of M1, the change of the narrowly 
defined stock of money depends on whether the increase in D offsets the decrease in C. If 
digital money balances are included in the definition of M1, M1 increases unambiguously. A 
summary of the results is given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Changes in M1 with non-binding reserve requirements* 
Definition of M1 Change in M1 
DCM   Not determined, increase more likely 
EMDCM   Increase 
* Changes in M1 with no or non-binding reserve requirements. If digital money balances are not 
included in the definition of M1, M1 will either increase or decrease. The sign of the change will 
depend on whether the decrease in currency, C, outweighs the increase in deposits, D.  If digital 
money balances are included in the definition of M1, the conversion would lead to a marginal 
increase of M1 because the decrease in C would be matched by an equal offsetting change in digital 
money balances, EM, and deposits, D, would increase marginally. 
 
Binding reserve requirements 
In the following analysis binding reserve requirements are in place and banks are willing to 
make loans and expand their deposits at the prevailing rate of return on loans and costs of 
deposits. Again, conversion directly affects M1 through a reduction in C and indirectly through 
a change in the reserve position of the bank receiving the unit of currency.  
The following analysis, based on the notion of a money multiplier, relies on a simple 
model of money creation. Money multipliers describe the relation between the various 
monetary aggregates and the monetary base. The monetary base consists of central bank 
currency in the hands of the public plus reserves of deposit institutions, i.e., banks. The 
relation between the monetary base and M1 is described as: 
( 8 )   HmM   
                                                 
17 In principle, substitution of central bank currency is equivalent to an expansionary open market operation 
because both events increase the supply of reserves. Thus, the effect of these two events on the size of deposits 
must be equivalent. Effectiveness of monetary operations relies on the assumption that a change in reserves 
results in a multiple change in deposits. 
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M is the stock of narrowly defined money (M1), H is the monetary base, and m is the 
money multiplier. In its simplest form, the money multiplier is derived by using the following 
relations: 
( 9 )    EMDCM   
( 10 )   H R C E    
( 11 )   EMrDrR EMD   
C is currency in the hands of the public, EM are digital money balances, D are demand 
deposits, R are required reserves, and E are excess reserves. rD is the required reserve ratio on 
demand deposits and rEM is the required reserve ratio on digital money balances. 
According to ( 9 ), the stock of narrowly defined money consists of currency holdings, 
demand deposits and, if included, digital money balances. According to ( 10 ), the monetary 
base consists of required reserves, currency and excess reserves and, according to ( 11 ), 
required reserves are reserves on demand deposits and reserves on digital money balances.  
Banks are willing to provide loans if the marginal return on loans is larger than the 
marginal cost of deposits. An implicit assumption of the money creation process, i.e., the 
multiplier model we study here is that this condition is always met.18 In this case, banks find it 
profitable to make loans whenever they have excess reserves. The size of deposit expansion 
depends on the reserve ratio on demand deposits, rD, and on the reserve ratio on electronic 
money balances, rEM. The results are presented in Table 3.19 
 
Table 3: Changes in M1 with binding reserve requirements* 
Definition of M1  0EMr  DEM rr   1EMr  
DCM   
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*Changes in M1 when banks expand their deposits as much as possible. The effect on M1 depends 
on the reserve requirements on digital money balances and the reserve requirements on deposits. 
 
                                                 
18 The multiplier model we study, therefore, implicitly assumes interest rate rigidity. That is, an increase in the 
supply of loans or an expansion of deposits does not affect the rate of return on loans or the costs of making 
deposits. One explanation for this price rigidity would be interest-rate ceilings of the “regulation Q” type seen 
until quite recently in the U.S. (Spencer, 1986). 
19 The derivations of the derivatives are in the appendix. 
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The first row of Table 3 describes changes in M1 when digital money balances are not 
included in the definition of the narrowly defined stock of money. Change in M1 depends on 
the reserve requirements on digital money balances, rEM. If DEM rr  1 , M1 increases. If 
DEM rr  1 , a conversion of central bank currency into digital money balances is neutral, it 
does not change M1. For large reserve requirements, if DEM rr  1 , the narrowly defined stock 
of money decreases. For example, if 1EMr , the stock of narrowly defined money decreases 
by one unit. Change in M1 depends also on the reserve requirements on deposits, rD. The larger 
rD, the smaller is the change in M1.  
The second row of Table 3 describes changes in M1 when digital money balances are 
included in the definition of the narrowly defined stock of money. In this case, the stock of 
narrowly defined money increases if the reserve requirements are not equal to one. If 1EMr , 
a conversion of central bank currency into digital money balances is neutral. Again, the larger 
the reserve requirements on deposits, rD, the smaller is the change in M1.  
A final note is required, here. The results of Table 3 implicitly assume that demand 
deposits and, if so, electronic money balances are the only reservable liabilities of banks. If 
other liabilities were subject to reserve requirements, some of the excess reserves created by 
the substitution of central bank currency would be used to expand these other types of 
liabilities. This would reduce the potential of expansion of M1 and change the derivatives in 
Table 3.   
In the remainder of this paper we consider measures central banks can take to prevent 
potential changes in M1. They have four:  
 They can limit the proliferation of digital money products to prevent replacement of 
central bank currency. 
 They can issue digital money products and treat digital money balances in the same 
way they handle central bank currency.  
 They can apply high reserve requirements on digital money balances. 
 They can absorb -- sterilize -- the excess liquidity created by appropriate monetary 
operations. 
Legal restrictions to prevent proliferation of digital money products will be difficult to 
justify, especially in light of efforts to deregulate and improve the efficiency of the financial 
sector. Moreover, measures that prevent development of digital money products will result in a 
competitive disadvantage. Nations that develop these products will thereby take a lead in a 
crucial technological sector. In addition, digital money easily crosses international borders and 
it will be difficult to control foreign digital money products that could eventually emerge as a 
medium of exchange in the home country. 
Central banks could provide digital money in the same way as they provide paper 
currency right now. The Bank of Finland, for example, is developing a cash-card system 
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through its corporate subsidiary, Avant Finland Ltd. (Bernkopf 1996). Most central banks, 
however, remain passive in this respect. There is concern that central banks issuing digital 
money products could limit competition and reduce incentives in the private sector to innovate 
further digital money products (BIS 1996b).  
Central banks could require reserves on digital money balances. High reserve 
requirements can make digital money products neutral with respect to changes of the narrowly 
defined stock of money. However, since the main incentive to issuing digital money products 
is the interest-free debt financing that digital money balances provide, high reserve 
requirements will make it less profitable to issue digital money and will hold back its 
development.  
The drawback of the first three measures is that they reduce the private sector’s incentive 
to invest in the development of digital money products. It is, therefore, likely that central banks 
will hold the money supply constant by appropriate monetary operations, thereby gradually 
shrinking the monetary base. 
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Summary 
 
Section I studied digital money’s potential to replace central bank currency. It suggested that 
digital money poses a credible threat to paper currency because it is specifically designed to 
make small value payments in retail transactions and because it would reduce transaction costs 
for consumers and businesses. The main obstacle to its success, beside legal restrictions, are 
network externalities, i.e., the benefit of using a particular digital money product depends on 
the number of its users. If few merchants accept digital money, the benefits to households to 
use digital money products are low. Similarly, if few consumers use digital money, a merchant 
has little incentive to accept digital cash. These network externalities suggest that even though 
use of digital money would benefit firms and households, paper currency will not be replaced 
easily. Issuers of digital money products will have to convince consumers and shop owners 
that their product will succeed in the market against other digital money schemes and other 
traditional media.  
Section I also suggested that even in a cashless society, demand for digital money would 
be low and demand for network money would be negligible. Low demand for digital money, as 
predicted by Baumol-Tobin type models, is due to the low cost of transferring value from a 
transaction deposit on a smart card or computer.  
Section II examined the impact of digital money on the demand for bank reserves and on 
the implementation of monetary policy. A widespread use of digital money could affect 
demand for reserves as follows: ( 1 ) It would reduce demand if digital money were to 
substitute for reservable deposits. However, the reduction should be moderate because digital 
money is expected to substitute mainly for central bank currency. ( 2 ) Digital money products, 
particularly, software-based digital money products could increase the pressure on central 
banks to reduce the number of reservable liabilities and to lower reserve ratios to help 
domestic banks compete against foreign intermediaries that may increasingly attract 
(transaction) deposits from residents across public computer networks. ( 3 ) It would increase 
demand if banks were to substitute vault cash for reserves held at the central bank to meet 
reserve requirements. ( 4 ) The demand for settlement balances is likely to be unaffected by 
digital money because, as suggested by liquidity management approach models, digital money 
does neither affect the need for settlement balances not the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves. This implies that even with zero reserve requirements or even when digital money 
products extensively substitute for reservable deposits, the settlement function of central banks 
would guarantee an ongoing demand for reserves. 
Section II also suggested that implementation of monetary policy could be complicated by an 
extensive substitution of central bank currency. In many countries a complete substitution of 
central bank currency would shrink the monetary base to less than one half; in Canada, for 
example, it would shrink approximately by 95 percent. The small size of open market 
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interventions in normal days suggests that even in this extreme case the monetary base would 
remain a viable policy instrument and that open-market operations would work as they do 
today. However, in turbulent times, in particular, when exchange rates commitments are 
challenged by market forces, central banks may not be able to successfully sterilize liquidity 
generated by foreign market intervention. Consequently, central banks may be less able to 
commit to a particular exchange rate while simultaneously following other monetary policy 
goals. 
Section III considered digital money’s effect on the income velocity of base money and 
on the narrowly defined stock of money. Shrinkage of the monetary base suggests an ever-
increasing velocity of base money. Moreover, during the transition period, velocity of base 
money could be less stable. High levels of velocity and unpredicted variations are troublesome 
for countries that rely on monetary aggregates either as targets or as indicators.  
Digital money’s effect on the narrowly defined stock of money would depend on the 
reaction of central banks. Without sterilization, a replacement of central bank currency would 
increase the supply of bank reserves and, therefore, the effect on the narrowly defined stock of 
money would be equivalent to an (expansionary) open market operation that provides 
additional reserves to the banking system. Central banks, therefore, face a trade-off: Either 
they hold the monetary base constant, thereby accommodating the expansionary effect of a 
higher reserve level, or they sterilize the additional reserves, thereby shrinking the monetary 
base. It is most likely that central banks would absorb the excess liquidity by selling assets. 
However, to avoid erosion of the monetary base, central banks could be tempted to resort to 
alternative measures. They could limit the proliferation of digital money products. They could 
issue digital money themselves or they could apply high reserve requirements on digital money 
balances. The drawback of these measures is that they would reduce the private sector’s 
incentives to invest in the development of digital money products. 
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Appendix 
Binding reserve requirements 
Digital money is not included in the definition of M1. 
Totally differentiate ( 2 ) to get dDdCdM  . An increase in vault cash, VC, can either be 
used to expand deposits, D, digital money balances, EM, or it adds to excess reserves, E: 
dEdEMrdDrdVC EMD  . Because dCdVC  , which implies that 
dEdEMrdDrdC EMD  . By assumption, 0dE  and dEMdC  , which implies that 
dC
r
rdD
D
EM 1 . Hence, dC
r
rdCdM
D
EM 1  and dC
r
rrdM
D
EMD  1 . 
Digital money is included in the definition of M1. 
Totally differentiate ( 2 ) to get dEMdDdCdM  . Again dEdEMrdDrdC EMD  . 
By assumption 0dE , dEMdC  , which implies that dCdC
r
rdCdM
D
EM  1  and 
dC
r
rdM
D
EM 1 . 
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